PanARMENIAN.Net - The first danger, naturally, proceeds from the fact that it is "necessary to return" the territories, which actually make up the safety zone in military-strategic respect. The actual border between NKR and Azerbaijan lies precisely on the boundary of these regions, including defense installations. And if we are forced to hand over those five regions, these installations will go under the control of the Azerbaijani army and the latter will easily execute the blitzkrieg it has so long been speaking about. Moreover, Nagorno Karabakh will no longer be able to form a similar defense system - Stepanakert will neither be allowed, nor will she have relevant resources. Though, Madrid principles also very indefinably suggest the necessity of overland communication with Armenia, it is so unreal that it is not even worth dwelling on. The so-called corridor will be immediately populated with Azeris, and it will be possible only to dream of a safe road from Armenia to NKR.
The second danger consists in the return of the internally displaced people and refugees to places of permanent inhabitancy. About 40-50 thousand Azeris and 120 thousand Armenians lived in the NKR before 1988. But as soon as return mechanisms are introduced, the ratio immediately changes. There is a probe-tested method of changing the demographic setting: criminals are set free with the obligation to live where the authorities will settle them. It happened so in Cyprus in 1975, when Turkey let out from prisons about 25 thousand criminals, populating them in the northern occupied part of the island. It was also the case with Baku, when the released criminals were sent to raid and kill Armenians in 1988. Thus, it is exactly what awaits Nagorno Karabakh. Moreover, the ephemeral promise of "free will" will lead exactly to the result so much desired by Azerbaijan: Armenians will be a minority in NKR.
Besides, the principles also imply quartering of international peacemakers in the conflict zone. How peacemakers "maintain peace" we know quite well from the Balkan experience.
In subtotal, situation is as follows: Stepanakert upsets all the efforts of the world and European communities, thus bringing the Karabakh party into complete isolation and drawing in this orbit also Armenia, which under appropriate agitation of a number of oppositional forces will divide the society into conformist-traitors and moderate patriots, who join hands with radicals. Such a distribution puts Armenia into a weaker position both in the world arena and in the framework of the negotiation process. Armenia, that has no control over Stepanakert, in the eyes of the world community loses the moral right to conduct negotiations, and the political competence as a negotiating party is reduced to zero. Moreover, the military security guarantee of the Artsakh people from the political-legal point of view becomes an extremely problematic task for Armenia. However, it is also possible to spit on the opinion of the world community and it is exactly what will be done at the last moment. Then the positions of Baku that consecutively conducts clear, bright and simple policy as a guarantor of stable policy and a party that knows how to patiently and "peacefully" solve any problem will arouse sympathies in the immoral Europe and Russia.
In case Armenia signs any peace agreement on the Madrid principles, about which we have only very rough ideas and which may prove to be consonant to Aliyev's statement, and in case Stepanakert refuses to satisfy their conditions, a political-legal situation will arise under which Baku will have full authority to launch military operations and to "force to peace", while Armenia, on the contrary, being obliged by a previously-signed document, will not have a right to introduce troops into NKR as a guarantor of safety, on the basis that Stepanakert refuses to recognize the peace signed by Armenia, who used to be her delegate in negotiations.
Armenia should not sign any agreements, which do not clearly define the procedure of determination of the NKR status on conditions advantageous both for Armenia and NKR, which must be carried out simultaneously with the withdrawal of the Armenian troops from some liberated territories. As for some certain lands, Baku had better forget about them for good. Spectral agreements concerning a referendum to be conducted in 5 or 10 years' time should never be signed by Armenia. We know from history the price of the obligation signed in its time by the Ottoman Empire under the pressure of conqueror Europe or Russia, according to which there were to be conducted constitutional reforms for Christians and for Armenians, in particular. The experience gained from history and the signed international legal documents concerning Armenians throughout history, testify that we should not make any kind of concessions in any of provisions. Wars occur for the very purpose to put full-stops on the problems not resolved by diplomats. After 1994 we have the right to require the recognition of the independent status of NKR in exchange for some territories, the loss of which does not present any strategic danger