Azerbaijan will not derive clear profit from transfer of Karabakh issue in UN

Divergence of the kind is not a novelty. There are plenty of mutually excluding statements. It's not hard to clarify their essence. How do skirmishes influence on the situation? First of all, it's a cynical means to aggravate tension and incite hatred toward the adversary, to test the positions and efficiency. Incidents emerge by another reason as well. Refusing to move away the frontline, Baku preserved the previous distance between the armed forces (several hundreds meters, as it used to be during the war) and even tried to shorten it lately. Not only soldiers and officers but also civilians die. Here a question arouses: what is more important - people's life or maintenance of tension? Which side is interested in strained atmosphere at the contact line? Isn't it the one threatening with revenge?

There is one more aspect. On Russia's initiative, February 4, 1995 all three parties to the conflict signed a ceasefire agreement under the aegis of the OSCE. They undertook to communicate in order to localize and settle the conflict as well as prevent development of enemy propaganda. The document was signed by the Defense Ministers with the approval of Heydar Aliyev, Levon Ter-Petrosian and Robert Kocharian.

However, the sides fail to obey the agreement. When I pointed out to the anomaly, Armenia's Serge Sargsyan and NK's Seyran Ohanyan over 2 years ago publicly announced they are ready to fulfill the provisions of the agreement if Baku does the same. However, Safar Abiyev was not capable to utter anything, except for threats. Even tactful Elmar Mammadyarov drags out the problem until final resolution of the conflict. Baku doesn't seem to need either Karabakh's participation in the agreement or close contacts between the sides. And finally, it seems quite uninterested in settling the incidents.

That's a reasonable question. It proves inaccuracy and feebleness of those who pressed for MG's leading role in the Karabakh settlement. By the way, this agreement signed by the parties is the OSCE's only asset. Even Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk, who has conducted monitoring of the frontline twice a month for 10 years, came to know about it in 2003, thanks to an article of mine. The Co-chairs mentioned about the agreement in their London statement in 2005 but failed to urge its implementation. Political will is needed for it. But is it directed correctly? If Baku rates it as imperfect, so it could be amended. At worst, a new one could be developed. The problem is pressing: people die, tension generates. Informing of incidents almost every day, Baku pretends to be badly concerned about the issue. But where is the logic? Where are proposals? Or must it just be so?

The less they are informed the better is for the initiators. However, Azerbaijan will not derive clear profit from this move. Azeris will mount their hobby-horse and urge implementation of the UN Security Council's resolution on Karabakh. But how are they going to conceal that they failed to fulfill all UN demand except for ceasefire. It's worth mentioning that this provision was observed partially, for hostilities have been suspended but incidents are still provoked. It was Baku that upset 4 agreements in 1993-94. Documents are available. It's not accidental that after Baku's violating the ceasefire in 1993, the UN Security Council stopped to issue resolutions on Karabakh. What is a year of war? How many people died? How many people left their homes? The Azerbaijani population suffered from non-fulfillment of the resolutions most of all. Not the resolutions but the fear of complete collapse made Baku agree to ceasefire. Other facts can also come to light in the UN General Assembly. So, GUAM member states will not have an easy deal in New York.

As a matter of fact, ability of the parties to the Karabakh conflict to make agreements and fulfill commitments is questioned. Threats to resume hostilities run counter to the commitment to resolve the conflict peacefully, as urged by the Council of Europe entry condition. Verbal threats are transformed into real deeds through armament race and incitement of hatred towards the neighbor nation.

Two out of three parties cannot agree on settlement 'principles'. However, to sign an agreement does not mean to implement it. That is why the OSCE should take it into account and refrain from superfluous 'tolerance' in the Karabakh issue. Presently, Armenians make use of Azerbaijan's obvious irresponsibility as regard the UN resolutions. But democracy is not the only point for competition. The state's consistency is also an important factor at the international arena.