Turkey and Iran can be neither friends nor allies; they are too different, and goals of the countries are diametrically contrasting. Both aspire to regional hegemony, and do it quite openly and toughly. It's obvious that neither of them is ready to give up the struggle. However, this not the only difference: Iran professes Orthodox Shiism, while the majority of Turkey's population is Sunni Muslims, this distinction being very important for Islamic countries. Quite dissimilar are the Persians and Turks also in terms of civilization. By and large, Turkey is even ready to, though only in words, sacrifice the relations with Israel for the sake of her "Iranian brothers". But is it really so? And finally, both countries are willing to participate in the process of regulating conflicts in the region, be it the Israeli-Palestinian, the Nagorno-Karabakh or the Russian-Georgian conflict.

Last year, Turkey presented the highly amorphous Caucasian Platform, where there was no place for Iran, but now, a year later, the situation has changed. But has it changed so much that Iran and Turkey are able to fully participate in negotiation processes? The settlement of conflicts was beautifully described by Pope Pius VI. And though he used the phrase when talking on the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is still quite relevant: "This problem has two solutions: a real one, if the Lord mediates and a fantastic one, if the parties agree". So, Turkey and Iran are eager to play their roles and show the West that they themselves can handle the regional conflicts. The West, of course, will never allow Turkey and Iran to interfere in the process. There has already been such a precedent once - Egypt participated in the Camp David negotiations, but she was more an interested party, that was why the parties arrived at an agreement. The result was a Nobel Peace Prize, followed by the violent death of Anwar Sadat and Yitzhak Rabin. It is unlikely that such a finale should satisfy the Iranian and Turkish leadership, and they are certainly aware of it.

But let us revert to the "brotherly relations". Both Turkish and Persian diplomacies are well experienced in treachery and craftiness, and are ready to strike the moment the enemy relaxes. On the other hand Tehran and Ankara very well know each other and are prepared for any eventuality. There is one more nuance: Erdogan apparently, or at least so it seems, thinks that it is easy to come to an understanding with Ahmadinejad. If he really thinks so, he makes an inexcusable mistake, underestimating his rival. If not, it is going to be very difficult for him. Iran is not the country to forgive or yield when it comes to her vital interests, and, even more so, when the issue of regional superiority is concerned. The Iranian President has no one to beware of; in his country he is really God and the king, in spite of the small opposition rallies. But Erdogan is in a more complicated position; he has an efficient opposition and an army. Moreover, still unresolved is the Kurdish question, together with the Armenian and Alawite. By the way, in our opinion, it is the growing closeness with Iran that forced the Turkish authorities to pay attention to the Alawites, who are almost in the same position as the Armenians and Kurds. Alawites - the Shiites and the solution of their problems - are another curtsey dropped to Tehran.

There is also, as we have already mentioned, the Russian factor, which both sides will try to make use of. But it would evidently be a losing situation because neither of the sides knows who Moscow is going to support. It is even possible that Russia supports Israel; Russian diplomacy has always been mysterious.