Turkish-Armenian relations are held hostage to Karabakh conflict more than to issue of Genocide recognition

The situation is, for now, stable and should remain so, barring an unforeseen renewal of conflict over Nagorno Karabakh or other disputed territories, which could have deeply destabilizing consequences for the region.

One concrete question involves the future of Georgia and NATO. Whether Georgia enters into a Membership Action Plan with NATO in the near future will have important consequences for its relations with its neighbors, most of all Russia. What we don't know, however, is whether a more realistic prospect of NATO membership for Georgia will pull Azerbaijan and even Armenia closer to the organization and whether such a situation would be tolerable to Moscow. On the other hand, if Georgia's integration with NATO stalls, this will also have a considerable impact on the region but exactly how is uncertain. Optimists suggest that Georgia's relations with Russia would improve, leading to a resolution of territorial conflicts and an increased atmosphere of stability in the region. Pessimists, however, are certain that this would only encourage Russia to continue keeping all three states of the Caucasus in a state of political and economic dependency.

I think only if internal developments in Turkey create a situation in which a Turkish government deems it in their interest to change its policy toward Armenia. I think this is unlikely, however, without a significant move on Armenia's part to ease the Karabakh conflict. Though the current peace process appears to have failed, I still have hope that a "package" deal can at some point be arranged by which Armenia returns most of the occupied territories outside Nagorno Karabakh in exchange for the normalization of relations with Turkey, postponing resolution of the political status of Nagorno Karabakh for a later date.

It is ironic that Turkish-Armenian relations are held hostage to the Karabakh conflict more than to the issue of genocide recognition, but I believe that this is indeed the case. If genocide recognition within Turkey happens at all, it will only come after a normalization of relations with Armenia, not before.

I don't see that Russia's position is weakening significantly in Armenia, or even so much in Azerbaijan. Thanks to its excessively punitive measures against Georgia, however, Russia has done more than NATO ever could to weaken its influence among Georgians. Economically, Russia could easily maintain and strengthen its position in the Caucasus for years to come. The question is whether it is willing and able to separate economic power from military and political power in the region, where its control cannot be taken for granted.

I wouldn't say that the "Jewish lobby" serves as a proxy for a Turkish lobby in Washington, only that the "pro-Israel" lobby sometimes has interests that coincide with Turkish ones.

Regarding the Armenian lobby, I can say that it does not always appear to act in the best interests of the Armenian nation. U.S. attention to Armenian interests would be higher if the U.S. Congress confirmed the appointment of an ambassador to Armenia, and if Congress was more sensitive to the importance of maintaining close relations with Turkey as the United States enters a new stage in its relationship with Iraq. I understand the immense importance of genocide recognition to Armenia and Armenian-Americans, but if this goal interferes with fundamental elements of U.S.-Armenian and U.S.-Turkish relations, it risks worsening those relations to the detriment of all parties.

There are many differences between Kosovo and the disputed territories in the Caucasus: demographics, population size, size of territory, and even the former constitutional relations between autonomous units and Soviet republics. And even if Kosovo becomes independent, no one is suggesting that it should become, for example, a precedent for Iraqi Kurdistan's independence. At the same time, independence for Kosovo will make Georgia and Azerbaijan more aware than ever before that independence for breakaway territories is theoretically a possible outcome for their conflicts as well. Possibly, this could encourage Georgia and Azerbaijan to think more creatively about how to preempt such outcomes by introducing more peaceful and positive mechanisms of conflict resolution.