"Suspended" State in South Caucasus Cannot Be Eternal

The situation in the South Caucasus is very unstable, it is an unstable balance, at the verge of war and peace, which cannot last long. There is some military and economic balance between the countries of the region, as well as inability of basic players - world and regional superpowers - to pursue their own policy, not looking back at the partners. Owing to these factors and inertia stability, there is still peace in the region. Unfortunately, this "suspended" state cannot be eternal, especially that it does not fit some people any more, for example Georgia, Azerbaijan, the US and EU. To the contrary, Armenia, Russia, Iran, Turkey, unrecognized states of the region are interested in preserving the status-quo. The powers wanting "unfreezing" of the region are rather influential and their actions are becoming more and more persistent. It would be a mistake to consider that it is possible "to unfreeze" conflicts and sustain regional stability. "Unfreezing" of the Karabakh conflict is inevitable, irrespective of the outcome. It will aggravate Armenian-Azeri relations, while unfreezing of the Georgian-Abkhaz or Georgian-Ossetian conflicts not only threatens further complication of Russian-Georgian relations, but will also ricochet other countries of the region. "Unfreezing" is undesirable, moreover is it likely and one should prepare to it.

Any meetings and talks - are already boon even if they bring no positive result. Much worse if the sides have no wish and possibility to meet and hold talks, let us take Georgia and Russian, for example. I do not think that that the potential of the Armenian-Azeri dialogue has been exhausted. Meetings at the presidential and ministerial level are a positive phenomenon but expecting the leaders to make halfway would be impracticable now. In my opinion, the problem of the Armenian-Azeri relations is the ill will of the peoples heated up by the history and patterns of the politicians. At the same time we are neighbors and will remain such. That is why the task of the peaceful process is to establish dialogue between the publics. In this case the terms of the Karabakh settlement, let it be 3 or 30 years, becomes not so important. The security zone and the actual front line can be maintained until they become unnecessary. May be it seems fantastic but I do not see any other way of settlement at present.

I do not think that the leaders of the two states should dedicate their meetings to the search of a universal compromise. They have better improve the atmosphere of the Armenian-Azeri relations. For example, establishment of transport communication should precede the conflict settlement.

Nagorno Karabakh's condition is beneficial as compared to the other unrecognized states. It has a security zone or "seized territories". However, it will be hard to preserve the current status quo, since the powers interested in its violation are too influential. Azerbaijan is rapidly gaining financial, economic, military and demographic resources and Armenia should reckon with it. A serious choice between war and compromise should be done. Neither of the sides is ready to choose. In future with the presence of good will it can be possible to speak of the formula of "peace and status in exchange for territories", that is of the establishment of a new border of independent Karabakh. I perfectly know that Stepanakert will not compromise over Lachin and Kelbajar, but there are other regions which are not so problematic to cede.

As for the refugee issue, there are well known approaches to exchange of population, territories and material compensations. Modern history records no single case of complete return of refugees. When resolving it one should proceed from reality but appeal to the graves of the ancestors. It's possible to achieve progress with good will and mediation. Of course, it does not mean that the problem of Nagorno Karabakh may be settled in 2006 or 2007. The process will be long. Talks always take more time than war does.

The sides should stop appealing to history. Each side has its arguments. To decide who is right one should be not only a historian but also an impartial specialist of the issue. Now it resembles dialogue of two deaf people. No one in the West or in Russia is intends to of into details. The ethnic right to the territory confirmed by history is not absolute and obligatory for us. Proceeding from the logic of ethnic right for territory Russia should demand Crimea from Ukraine and give Eastern Prussia to Germany. European states, not to mention the U.S., experience the same problems. Similar situation is the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts.

Russia has two clear objectives as regards Georgia. I am nor speaking of a fantastic dream to see Georgia a friendly state. Russia insists on maintenance of the current format of peacekeeping operation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia without making any attempt to internationalize the peaceful process. It first of all wishes the settlement to be convenient not for Moscow or Tbilisi but for the people of these unrecognized republics.

Georgia's aspiration to join the NATO tenses the relations. We do not eye the NATO as hostile organization but the anti-Russian vector has strengthened after Latvia, Estonia and to some extent Lithuania and Poland joint the Alliance. Georgia will boost this anti-Russian mood. We do not think that Georgia's joining the NATO is a decoded matter Influential states like Germany, France and Canada hold an opinion that the further enlargement of the NATO is inappropriate. Besides, Georgia will not meet the NATO standards in the near future not to mention the unsettled conflicts on the Georgian territory. The matter concerns only Tbilisi's joining the ID (Intense Dialogue). It does not lay any obligation on the Alliance and does not determine Georgia's membership on the NATO. That is why it cannot arouse Russia's discontent. Each country itself decided its military allies. However, Russia can take any move to prevent Georgia's membership in the NATO. Some forces in Tbilisi, Washington or Brussels may think that Russia "swallowing" NATO's enlargement towards the Baltic states will tolerate Georgia's joining the Alliance. Russia can for example one-sidedly recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Thus, Georgia will have to choose whether to grant independence to seceded autonomies and bravely head for the NATO or stay in actual war with Russia and forger about the NATO, since the Alliance will never accept Georgia, which is in state of war with its northern neighbor. Tbilisi can get into its own trap.

Turkey's joining the EU is unreal in foreseeable future. The EU can choke in the enlargement. No organization can develop eternally. Besides, enlargement at expense of admitting a major Islamic state can change the EU image and its ideology. At the same time rejection to accept Turkey may have unpredictable consequences. The European Union has entrapped itself by keeping Turkey on a short lead and giving uncertain promises. National processes ripen within the Turkish public. Disappointment in Europe is growing over Brussels' duplicity. Turkey insists on its own policy proceeding from its national interests but not the European solidarity. There will come a moment when the indignation of the Turkish public will dominate and the elite will understand that they are being deceived. Turkey will itself turn its back on the European Union. This scenario provides with new dangers and possibilities. It's easier to deal with a sovereign states than with a satellite