Moscow needs to reconsider its policy of "energy imperialism"

Deterioration of bilateral relations between Russia and Azerbaijan in 2006 has got a logical continuation in 2007. I regret that this vector of the Russian foreign policy has been left in the shade of Russia's complex relations with Georgia and Belarus as well as with the U.S. and EU member states. Meanwhile, weakening of Russia's positions in the "Azeri direction" is pregnant with serious change of the whole geopolitical picture of the South Caucasus. The "cooling" between Baku and Moscow promotes rapprochement of Azerbaijan and Georgia. Both Baku and Tbilisi have a common problem of "territorial integrity" (which first united these states in the GUUAM and then GUAM) and discrepancies with Moscow on the unrecognized republics. Formation of the Tbilisi-Baku axis works for weakening of Russia's strategic partner in the South Caucasus, Armenia, and increases the latter's interest in expanding contacts with the U.S. and EU. Thus, development of the Russian-Armenian partnership in many respects depends on constructive relations between Russia and Azerbaijan.

The sharp cooling of the Russian-Azeri relations in late 2006 formally began with outer reasons. First, Moscow requested Baku to suspend gas delivery to Georgia. When Baku refused to form an anti-Georgian alliance Gazprom raised the gas prices not for Georgia but also for Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan had to pay $235 instead of $110 for thousand cu m of gas. For its part Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said that such price "discords with the spirit and essence of the Russian-Azeri relations." Moreover, Aliyev junior did not rule out that "oil and gas relations between Moscow and Baku maintain a political implication." The result was that the Azeri authorities and Gazprom did not sign an agreement on delivery of Russian gas to Azerbaijan in 2007. The story was continued. February 7, in Tbilisi, top leaders of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey held a regional summit, which resulted in signing of agreement on construction of a strategically important Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku railroad. Some experts began speaking of a railway variant of Baku-Ceyhan. It's worth mentioning that the project is supposed to be completed by 2009 without Russia's participation and in bypass of Armenia. In general, such a development was expected but only the event of February 7, 2007 showed that the project will be launched in bypass of Armenia. The project tightened the Tbilisi-Baku economic knot. Moreover, Azerbaijan did a little "service" to Georgia in the form of a $200 million credit

The expected rapprochement of Baku and Tbilisi has been proved economically. The Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku railway project is essential for Turkey and Azerbaijan first of all, since the real geopolitical aim of the project is bypass of Armenia. The existing Kars-Gyumri branch line has not been used since mid 1990-ies. Economic expedience of the project is not clear yet. It's is mostly likely targeted at the future and supposed to become one of the most important transport corridors lining the East and West. Even the assistance of one of the most "substantial players", the U.S., proved unessential for the implementation of the project. As you know in July 2006 the House of representatives banned any funding of construction of a railroad bypassing Armenia. The U.S. Congressmen stood against Armenia's isolation. The Resolution H.R. 5068 says that the "taxpayers' money will not be used for a greater isolation of Armenia, which still suffers double blockade imposed by Turkey and Azerbaijan.

The U.S. leaders are far from building a "vertical line" and both the State Department and White House should reckon with the opinion of the Congressmen and influential Armenian lobby. Meanwhile the U.S. administration's stance is also known and, no doubt, certain "administrative resource" will be used for supporting the project. Not all is measured by money. Information support and positioning in favor of the "railway variant of Baku-Ceyhan" is worth something. Anyway, the fault Russia committed in late 2006, namely the energy pressure on Azerbaijan, resulted in boost of cooperation between Baku, Tbilisi, Ankara and a part of Washington's establishment. Meanwhile such cooperation did not seem obvious in July 2006, when the decision of Congressmen transformed the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku into a virtual project, especially since relationships between Ankara and Washington aroused many questions both in Turkey and American establishments.

Animation of the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Baku railway project became possible due to Russia's shortsighted policy aimed to restrain CIS "obstinate" member states. The matter first of all concerns Georgia. By applying sanctions against Tbilisi Moscow anchored hope with Georgia's neighbors. Closing of Verkhni Lars checkpoint at the Russian-Georgian border July 7-8, 2006 aroused ambiguous reactions in Yerevan. Plenty of questions emerged between Armenia and Russia. RA vice-speaker Vahan Hovhanniasian tied the checkpoint closure with tensed Russian-Georgian relations. "Russian counterparts should understand that the steps targeted against Georgia are harmful for Armenia as well and maximal flexibility is needed in such circumstances," he said at that time. The point is that all vital for Armenia communications are stretching via Georgia. However, Yerevan's discontent has a political motive as well. Deterioration of Armenian-Georgian relations is not profitable for Armenia.

Situation in the Armenian-inhabited Javakheti region of Georgia is far from being stable and Yerevan clearly understands that Armenia will not stand a second Karabakh. Armenia's disinterest in Kremlin's policy for restraining Georgia proceeds from this fact. Thus, Yerevan tries to maintain maximal reasonableness even somehow conniving the alarming situation in Javakhk through which a sector of the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku is supposed to pass.

Moscow and Yerevan's vision of the Armenian-Russian partnership and the Nagorno Karabakh problem weren't traditionally a topic of bilateral consensus. In this view, hopes for Baku's joining the "anti-Tbilisi" pact were not justified. Moscow's wish to restraint Azerbaijan encouraged Baku for activation of talks with NATO and conclusion of a trilateral agreement. Meanwhile, implementation of a railway project bypassing Armenia strengthens Azerbaijan's positions more than Turkey's.

I would like to recollect the words of Turkish researcher Burcu Gültekin, who said that Turkish policy is a hostage to relations with Azerbaijan. In her opinion, "opening of borders can make Armenians see Turkey in a better light and bring the relations between the two states out of today's crisis." Actually, Baku receives an extra trump card in its game in the South Caucasus. On one hand, a railroad will bypass Armenia, on the other hand, Azerbaijan will tie Georgia's hands with a credit. Furthermore, neither Turkey nor the U.S. incumbent administration will stand against. Thus, Russia's rude and shortsighted moves to hold Baku in check gave birth to new problems in the South Caucasus.

It's not surprising that Armenia tries to join the Transcaspian gas pipeline. Although Armenia is not included in the list of constructors the aspiration of the republic to find "insurance" sources to symbolically come out of Russia's energy guardianship. Yerevan is tired of being hostage to Kremlin and Gazprom and is not ready for the role of geopolitical infantry in combinations against Tbilisi and Baku. Moscow needs serious reconsideration of its policy of "energy imperialism". This tool is not working well and no one has been forced to knees so far. On the contrary, it attracted "non-regional players" and strengthened a pro-western tendency among the post-soviet states.